Tiptoeing through the Imperial Graveyard: Background and a Proposal for Afghanistan
Added by benarmstrong on 4/4/2009 10:34:40 AM
Abstract:
The United States’ 2001 intervention in Afghanistan inaugurated the American “War on Terror.” The military incursion sought to cripple the United States’ enemies, eliminating the threat that al Qaeda’s terrorism posed to the American homeland and its interests abroad. Security, however, was not the only goal. The Bush administration, upon defeating al Qaeda, aimed to aid and defend the long-oppressed Afghan population, the first step in a greater moral mission to spread democracy and “end tyranny in our world."  The reasoning behind the Afghan invasion blended security and ideological imperatives to form an entirely new category of foreign policy project.
Full text:
Unraveling into Chaos: a story of unintended consequences
 
          Until 2005, the Afghan intervention was considered a widespread success. Afghanistan had an elected government that seemed moderate and was friendly to the United States. Construction projects and other economic activity in Afghanistan were booming. Afghan girls were in school and beginning to enjoy the freedom from oppressive rule.[1] It was clear, four years after entering, that the US was “winning” in Afghanistan. However, it was due to a weak political settlement, poor border control and an erratic American foreign policy that the Taliban has re-emerged and Afghanistan is once again in chaos.
 
           Hamid Karzai, the current President of Afghanistan, emerged as the US-sponsored leader after the Bonn Conference in late 2001. The internationally-brokered conference sought to design a transitional government for Afghanistan that could arrange elections for a democratic Afghan government.[2] A diverse set of Afghan constituencies including representatives of the Northern Alliance and the majority ethnic Pashtuns voted for Karzai, a Pashtun, to lead the transitional government.[3] Though the coalition government received international praise, the alliance of disparate local interests formed an unstable central organization.
 
          The Karzai government has failed to project authority or bring security to the relatively autonomous regions of Afghanistan. Local warlords act largely independently of the national government, peddling influence through corrupt members of cabinet linked to the drug trade.[4] The Taliban has since mounted an opium-funded resurgent offensive that has led American commanders to admit that we are no longer “winning” in Afghanistan.[5] The overriding problem of the Bonn settlement is that it vested power in a national government. While Karzai and his allies have undoubtedly proven to be poor stewards of the national interest, the inherently decentralized nature of Afghan political culture was already stacked against them. Without investigating the details of the federalist relationship in the current Afghan system, it is clear that a westernized federal system is unlikely to function amidst the diverse, historically-decentralized Afghan society that cherishes consensus over competition.[6] The reduction in international support for the Karzai government and the intensified political and military instability surrounding it marks the failure of the international effort to democracy-build at Bonn.
 
          The weakness of the Afghan government manifests in its inability to control the Waziristan, its border region with Pakistan. After Taliban fighters mount attacks in Afghanistan, they can escape to Waziristan and find refuge among relatively autonomous warlords and tribal chiefs.[7] Both Karzai and successive Pakistani governments are responsible for this failure. While Pakistan initially signaled its support for the United States’ incursion into Afghanistan, it has since crafted successive truces with chiefs in Waziristan pledging non-interference.[8] The United States continues to pursue military targets in the border area from the air, but Pakistani unwillingness to secure its western border poses another daunting challenge to Afghan security.
 
          While it is clear that there were inherent challenges to the American incursion in Afghanistan, it did not make matters easier that the United States’ foreign attention was consumed by its concomitant intervention in Iraq. As the Bush Administration prepared the Iraq invasion, there was a strong contingent of international forces in Afghanistan and a nascent national government under Karzai. The Taliban was still weak. As US attention, funding and military personnel were siphoned to Iraq, Afghanistan slowly began to deteriorate. It is unclear whether Operation Enduring Freedom would have produced a stable central government even if Operation Iraqi Freedom never materialized. However, the redirection of resources and policy attention sapped American foreign policy of international support and may have allowed the Taliban to “reconstitute.”[9] 
 
Lessons and Conclusions
 
The 2001 Afghanistan intervention and its lasting consequences highlight the perils and challenges of intervention when faced with security threats emanating from failed states. The vacuum of political power in Afghanistan presented the temptation to state-build. While the US intervention was rightly predicated on security concerns, the American attempt to build and support a central Afghan government distracted from the mission at hand. It was this imposition of a political settlement at Bonn – accompanied by a larger commitment to “build the infrastructure of democracy” – that caused the United States to become mired in such instability. Alternatively, the United States should have limited its focus to security concerns and uprooting terrorist havens. The measure of success in Afghanistan is the stability of the territory and the security of its borders.
 
Afghanistan communicates two powerful lessons for the future of confronting failed states. One, intervening powers must resist imposing political values. While the opportunity for political influence is high, the risk is just as severe. Puppet regimes and indirect control often serve to stoke anti-American sentiment and instability. Two, interventionists must be willing to accept messy results. Ultimately, there might be no strong, centralized Afghan government. Opium may remain the main source of income for the ordinary Afghan. It is even likely that some human rights will continue to be infringed. However, the United States needs to trust that pursuing a security imperative will bring stability and in turn improve the lot of Afghans and brighten the future of Afghanistan.
 

[1] Srwary 20 Nov 2006.
[2] Maley 271.
[3] Saikal 236-237.
[4] Filkins 1 January 2009.
[5] Cowell 9 March 2009.
[6] Kinzer Lecture 3 March 2009
[7] Kinzer Lecture 3 March 2009. Kinzer noted that Pakistan acted as a haven for Afghan fighters.
[8] Perlez and Shah 5 March 2009.
[9] Rohde and Sanger 12 August 2007.
Coming Soon
Re-imagining Community Colleges (CAP) in Education by Center for American Progress



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