The Consequences of Withdrawal
Added by benarmstrong on 3/18/2009 11:28:15 AM
Abstract:
The Obama speech outlining his administration's Iraq withdrawal plan marked the culmination of the recently-inaugurated president's persistent opposition to the war.  While withdrawal will likely cost less than staying indefinitely, it is necessary to prepare our foreign policy for prolonged Iraqi instability and possible state collapse.
Full text:
U.S. foreign policy, upon American troop withdrawal from Iraq, must recognize the continuing fragility of the Iraqi constitutional establishment.  It must realize the challenges and threats that 1) federalist tensions and 2) resurgent conflict between warlords and Islamists will continue to pose.

1) While the constitution of Iraq has provisions for stronger regional autonomy, the national government is still charged (constitutionally) with managing the nation's security and oil revenues. Reconstruction is more of a blurry arena considering the ascent of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Some would say that security, too, is becoming more of a local prerogative in light of the Sunni Awakening's stunning success.  The confusion between national and local authority is a cause for concern.  

Continued stability in Iraq -- the most ambitious of America's current foreign policy goals -- is contingent on cooperation between the federal, regional and local governmental organizations.  The United States -- in helping draft the Iraqi Constitution -- vested significant power in the national government.  However, the politics surrounding the surge -- particularly assistance to local security brigades that now comprise the Sunni Awakening -- focused on strengthening institutions from the bottom up.  Conflicts may arise from this policy and those like it due to blurred lines of governmental authority.  Does the Iraqi government control security in Anbar or do certain Sunni factions?  Without clear delegations of authority, conflict between the Shia government and Sunni provinces may occur not long after an American withdrawal.

2) The surge not only pits local authority against the inchoate national government; it also supplies sketchy militiamen-types with piles of arms.  U.S. foreign policy's history of befriending her foe's foe has proven wrongheaded.  In Afghanistan and throughout Latin America, the US learned that the anti-Communist is not an absolute good, but often a brutal strongman.  In Iraq, U.S. foreign policy must be wary of providing military support for actors whose sole merit is their willingness to oppose the current enemy.  No matter how vibrant of a democracy the US claims Iraq to be, the rules will be set by those with the guns.  

As the US supplies guns to Sunnis who have the potential to become warlords (like local Somali leaders), she must be keenly aware that the Sunnis Shia Islamist opponents continue to receive weaponry from a variety of sources.  The Mahdi Army has not been defeated militarily; it has chosen not to fight.  There are rumors -- unsubstantiated, I admit -- that Sadr's army will mount a vigorous campaign to recapture territory upon American withdrawal.  In sum, where arms are concerned, beware of another Somalia.  There is certainly a well-armed and well-organized Shi'a Islamist contingent including, but not limited to, the Mahdi Army.  When the US supplies local warlord types without particular concern for their leadership credentials, she should not be surprised when a backlash materializes.

Strategically, there will also be specific territorial challenges for the Iraqi national government, which will be covered in a later article.  These challenges will most likely materialize in Kirkuk and Baghdad, two of Iraq's most diverse, unstable and potent cities. The extent of these challenges will begin to crystallize as the withdrawal plan takes shape.  

Finally, the future of the US's Iraq policy must represent a humanitarian imperative.  The crushing hardships that millions of Iraqis now face due to war and US occupation are different than those under the Hussein regime, but they are horrific just the same.

US humanitarian aid -- to be addressed in more detail elsewhere -- must continue to reach Iraqi citizens irrespective of political instability.  Her commitment to reconstruction and opportunity for Iraqis must continue, even if her military commitment to securing "democracy" does not.
Coming Soon
Re-imagining Community Colleges (CAP) in Education by Center for American Progress



Login